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1. Introduction 
In  many  educational  organizations  there  exist 
restrictions  on  which  courses  might  run,  due  to  the 
overheads of running too many courses. Now, in the 
context  of  personalized  learning,  where  students  are 
taking more control of their learning, we would like the 
decision  about  which  courses  are  run  to  be  made 
collectively by the students, while taking into account 
their individual preferences. Multiagent systems are a 
powerful technology to tackle this complexity and to 
enable  ﬂexible  course  selection  systems  because  of 
features such as autonomy, responsibility, social ability 
and  intelligence  [1,  2].  In  particular,  voting  systems 
can  be  used  to  reach  a  socially  desirable  decisions, 
while taking into account individual preferences [3] 
In this paper, we use a voting protocol introduced in 
our previous work [4], which combines features from 
single transferable vote (STV) and cumulative voting 
[5]. Specifically, this protocol takes advantage of the 
features  of  cumulative  voting  to  express  the 
preferences using points and, at the same time, allows 
for multiple rounds to avoid wastage by allowing the 
transfer of points in a similar way to the transfer of 
votes in STV. In addition, we introduced a number of 
voting strategies that can be used by the student agents 
in the system.  However, different  from our previous 
work, where courses were independent, we extend this 
work  by  considering  a  more  complex  setting  with 
combinatorial student preferences. 
Combinatorial preferences have been mostly studied 
within the context of combinatorial auctions, although 
there  are  a  couple  of  papers  that  consider  such 
preferences in a voting setting [6, 7]. In these works, 
agents  are  assumed  to  vote  for  given  bundles  of 
candidates.  Since  enumerating  all  possible 
combinations of candidates is typically infeasible, the 
main problem is then which of these bundles should be 
selected by the system and voted on by the agents. Our 
paper takes a different approach and uses a multi-round 
voting  protocol,  where  in  each  round  the  candidate 
with  the  least  number  of  votes  is  eliminated. 
Furthermore, it uses an agent-based approach where in 
both  combinatorial  voting  and  auctions  there  are  a 
number  of  languages  for  representing  preferences. 
Some  of  these  languages  are  tailored  to  represent 
cardinal  preferences  while  others  represent  ordinal 
preferences.  Expressing preferences that allows agents 
to specify preferences concisely and clearly include the 
OR-language and XOR-language  from combinatorial 
auctions [8]. In this paper, we use the same principle as 
the languages discussed above, but limit the number of 
combinations  only  by  consider  interdependencies 
between two courses.  
2. The Multiagent System 
Figure 1 shows the entities and objects that form the 
system.  Our  system  consists  of  a  single  university 
agent (UA) and several student agents (SAs). The SA 
contains the student’s preferences (in our experiments 
we  automatically  generate  these  according  to  the 
parameters of the experiment) and also an appropriate 
voting strategy. Then the SAs and the UA use a voting 
procedure  to  interact  with  each  other  and  determine 
which courses to run.  
 
Figure 1. System architecture 
The voting protocol proceeds in several rounds as 
follows. Each SA initially receives an equal and fixed 
number of points. In each round, each SA can allocate 
some or all of their available points to the available 
courses. After that, the UA cancels the course with the 
lowest  cumulative  points.  Then,  the  UA  refunds  the 
points for the cancelled course and informs all the SAs 
about the cancelled course, and the current cumulative 
points  allocated  to  the  remaining  courses  (this 
information about how others have voted collectively 
can then be used by the agent's voting strategy to place 
votes in subsequent rounds). The protocol proceeds to 
the  next  round  and  SAs  can  vote  again  using  their remaining points (this includes the refunded points and 
any points left in the previous rounds). The process is 
repeated  until  the  desired  number  of  courses  is 
remaining. For more details see [4].  
2.1 Student Preferences 
The student preferences are modeled using a utility 
function.  Importantly,  the  utility  of  a  course  may 
depend of which other courses are running. We have 
two types of relationship: complementary (AND) and 
substitute (OR). In more detail, two courses, A and B, 
are complementary when the student is only interested 
in choosing course A if course B is running, and vice 
versa. Conversely, courses A and B are substitutes if a 
student is interested in course A or course B, but not 
both.    We  assume  that  each  student  has  a  (possibly 
different) set of rules, where each represents either an 
AND or an OR relationship between a pair of courses.  
Given  this,  the  utility  function  of  a  student  is 
modeled as follows. Let     {          } denote the 
set of courses, and     ⃗⃗⃗    {            } the individual 
utilities (in case there are no rules) for these courses, 
where  m  is  the  total  number  of  available  courses  to 
choose from.  Furthermore, let      denote the set of 
OR  rules,  which  specifies  a  set  of  pairs  of  courses 
         and,  similarly,        denotes  the  set  of  AND 
rules. To avoid conflicts, we assume that each course is 
only  part  of  one  rule.  Therefore,  the  same  course 
cannot appear both in an OR rule and an AND rule. 
Then,  the  utility  for  a  set  of  running  courses  is 
calculated as follows. For any running course    that 
does appear in a rule, the utility is simply the sum of 
the individual utilities    of those courses.  For any pair 
of courses (     )      , if both courses are running, 
the utility for the pair is             . If only one of 
them  is  running,  then  the  utility  is  equal  to  the 
individual  utility  for  that  course.  For  any  pair  of 
courses (     )       , if both courses are running, 
the utility for the pair is        . Otherwise, the utility 
is  zero.  The  total  utility  is  then  the  sum  of  the 
individual  courses  without  rules,  and  the  pairs  with 
rules. Using this utility, we then calculate the student 
satisfaction by taking the utility as a percentage of the 
utility the student would achieve when all the courses 
would be running.  
2.2 Strategies  
In this paper we use the same strategies from [4] but 
extend  the  more  advanced  strategies  to  take  the 
complex preferences into account.  
Equal share: This strategy is used as a benchmark 
and simply allocates an equal number of votes to each 
course,  regardless  of  the  student’s  preference. 
Formally, the total number of points to be allocated to 
course j, is given by          , where RP denotes the 
total number of points remaining. 
 Proportional: This strategy allocates all the points 
proportionally  to  the  utility  for  individual  courses. 
Furthermore,  the  strategy  takes  the  AND  rule  into 
account by not placing any votes if their counterpart 
has been cancelled. Formally, let C' denote the set of 
courses  that  are  not  cancelled,  and  that  contain  no 
courses  from  any  AND  rule  where  one  of  them  is 
cancelled.  Then,  the  total  number  of  points  to  be 
allocated to course         is: 
    
  
∑         
     
Intelligent: This more sophisticated strategy tries to 
predict the probability that a course will be cancelled 
based on the number of points currently allocated to 
each  course  from  previous  rounds.  Furthermore,  it 
considers the rules between courses when calculating 
this probability.  This  strategy  does not  spend all the 
points in the first round, in order to take advantage of 
the information that is received in subsequent rounds. 
Otherwise, it would only have the points returned from 
cancelled  courses  to  use  in  these  rounds.  In  the  last 
voting  round,  it  allocates  all  remaining  points. 
Furthermore, in first round, because the strategy does 
not have any information about courses, it distributes 
half  of  the  points  using  the  proportional  strategy  as 
explained above.  
The  strategy  tries  to  estimate  the  probabilities  of 
courses  being  cancelled  for  a  given  allocation  of 
points, using a softmax function [9]. Then, given these 
probabilities, it tries to estimate the expected utility for 
a given distribution of points. Finally, it uses a search 
algorithm to find the point allocation which maximizes 
expected satisfaction. Formally, the probability that a 
course i is going to be cancelled is given by: 
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Where     is the cumulative number of points which 
have  so  far  been  allocated  to  course      (including 
points  from  other  agents),  and      is  the  number  of 
points that the SA is planning to allocate to course    
in  the  current  voting  round,  and    ⃗   is  the  vector  of 
points  to  be  allocated.  Furthermore,     is  a  constant 
which  enables  a  range  of  different  strategies.  For 
example, if      , then each course is equally likely to 
be cancelled, irrespective of the cumulative number of 
points  currently  allocated.  At  the  other  extreme,  as 
     ,  the  course  with  the  lowest  total  number  of 
points  will  be  cancelled  with  probability  1,  and  all 
other courses will be cancelled with probability 0.  
We now show how we can use this probability to 
calculate the expected utility, EU, of an SA, given the vector of points,   ⃗ , and taking into account both AND 
and  OR  relationship.  Suppose  we  have  an  AND 
relationship between     and   . In order to calculate 
the expected utility, given the  probability that both of 
these courses will run, i.e.,     (      ⃗⃗ )       (      ⃗⃗ ), 
where      (      ⃗⃗ )              (      ⃗⃗ ).  Now,  in  the 
case of the OR relationship between    and   , we need 
to consider also the possibility that only one of them 
will  run,  and  the  other  is  canceled.  This  gives  the 
following  expected  utility  for  individual  or  pairs  of 
courses, depending on the rules between courses: 
  No rule:           (      ⃗⃗ )      
     AND    :              (      ⃗⃗ )        (       ⃗⃗ )             
     OR    :             (      ⃗⃗ )        (       ⃗⃗ )  
                  (      ⃗⃗ )           (       ⃗⃗ )       
         (      ⃗⃗ )        (      ⃗⃗⃗ )      
The  total  expected  utility  is  then  the  sum  of  the 
utilities  for  individual  courses  without  rules,  and 
course pairs with rules.  
The  next  step  is  then  to  find  the  allocation  that 
maximises  this  expected  utility.  We  used  random 
sampling  by  randomly  generating  1000  vectors    ⃗  
subject to the constraint that the total number of points 
is equal to the  number of points that we would like to 
spend in the current round. We then take the allocation 
with the highest expected satisfaction. 
3. Evaluation 
In  this  section,  we  evaluate  the  voting  procedure 
and explore the impact of the three strategies described 
above on the overall student satisfaction. We consider 
3  different  scenarios.  Table 1  shows  the  settings  for 
these  cases  of  different  scenarios  (for  more  details 
see[4] ). We run each scenario 30 times with different 
randomly  generated  student  preferences,  to  obtain 
statistically significant results.  
Table 1. Different setting to the scenarios 
Scenario  #courses (m)  #running courses (r)  #students (n) 
1  51  40  100 
2  33  11  60 
3  18  9  20 
3.1 Student Agent Preferences 
For  each  simulation  run,  we  generate  the  student 
preferences  as  follows.  We  first  randomly  generate 
preferences  for  individual  courses  from  a  uniform 
distribution between 0 and 10. Then, we generate the 
AND  and  OR  relationships  as  follows.  First,  we 
generate all possible AND and OR relationships. Then, 
we  select  a  subset  of  these  rules  from  which  the 
students  can  select.  We  do  this  to  increase  the 
likelihood  that  groups  of  students  have  similar 
relationships between courses. This is true in practice, 
since  often  students  have  the  same  relationships 
between  courses,  even  if  they  value  the  individual 
courses  differently.  We  can  vary  the  degree  of 
similarity  by  changing  the  size  of  the  subset  as  a 
percentage of the total number of rules.  
3.2 Analysis 
We  compare  the  case  where  a  proportion  of  the 
students  use  one  strategy,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
students  uses  another  strategy.    In  the  results  that 
follow,  the  y-axis  shows  the  student  satisfaction  for 
each group of agents using a particular strategy, as well 
as the overall average satisfaction. Furthermore, on the 
x-axis  we  vary  the  proportion  of  students  using  a 
particular strategy for different percentage of applied 
rules. For example, in figures 2 and 3, 10-90 means 
that 10 students use the proportional strategy, and 90 
students  use  the  equal  share  strategy  and  this  is 
repeated  for  three  different  settings:  NO  rules,  50% 
rules  and  100%  rules.  The  errorbars  show  the  95% 
confidence intervals.  
The  results  in  figures  2  and  3  show  that  the 
intelligent and proportional strategies are both clearly 
better than the equal share. Moreover, as the number of 
rules  increases,  the  better  the  intelligent  and 
proportional  strategies  perform.  On  average,  the 
improvement  is  around  4%,  6%,  9%,  for  NO  rules, 
50%  and  100%  rules  respectively.  Furthermore,  the 
average  satisfaction  of  all  students  also  increases, 
which means that the allocation is more efficient when 
students use a more intelligent voting approach.  The 
results  for  other  scenarios  are  very  similar  and  not 
shown to avoid repetition.  
 
Figure2. Scenario 2: Proportional vs. Equal Share
 
Figure 3. Scenario 2: Intelligent vs. Equal Share 
 
100% rules  50% rules  No rules 
100% rules  50% rules  No rules Figures  4,  5  and  6  compare  the  results  using  the 
intelligent strategy and the proportional strategy for the 
3  different  scenarios.  Figure  4  shows  that,  at  first 
glance,  the  performance  of  intelligent  strategy 
increases,  comparing  to  proportional  strategy,  as  the 
students apply more rules. However, in most cases this 
result is not statistically significant. The reason is that, 
first,  in  scenario  1,  the  number  of  courses  that  the 
students vote over is large. This means that the range 
of  student  choice  is  wide,  and  students  have  a  wide 
range of preferences. Second, the number of students 
voting is also large. This means that each individual 
student has very little voting power. To analyze this, 
we  now  consider  a  setting  where  the  number  of 
students and courses are small. 
Figures  5  and  6  show  that,  with  relatively  few 
courses and students, there are clear differences in the 
performance  of  the  intelligent  and  proportional 
strategies.  The  intelligent  strategy  significantly 
outperforms proportional strategy when student apply 
rules and this superiority is increased as more rules are 
applied.  This  holds  in  almost  all  cases  where  rules 
were  applied,  according  to  a  t-test  with  95%.  This 
suggests that, when students have fewer choices and 
therefore  there  is  less  differentiation  between  the 
students, and when the number of students is not too 
large,  the  intelligent  strategy  perform  better  than 
proportional.  Note  also  that,  as  the  proportion  of 
students  using  the  intelligent  strategy  increases,  the 
student  satisfaction  of  all  students  either  stays  the 
same, or increases. Therefore, using a more intelligent 
approach does not harm the system as a whole. 
 
Figure 4. Scenario 1: Proportional vs. Intelligent 
 
Figure 5. Scenario 2: Proportional vs. Intelligent 
 
Figure 6. Scenario 3: Proportional vs. Intelligent 
4. Conclusion 
We  presented  a  multiagent  system  for  course 
selection based on voting theory, where students have 
complementary and substitutable preferences between 
courses.  We  also  developed  a  number  of  voting 
strategies that student agents could use to place votes 
on  a  student's  behalf.  We  found  that,  when  students 
have complex preferences and the number of students 
is not too large such that each individual student can 
affect  the  voting  outcome,  the  intelligent  strategy 
performs significantly better than proportional. 
Our future work consists of two parts. First of all, 
we  intend  to  apply  fairness  principals  to  the  voting 
outcome.  Furthermore,  we  intend  to  consider  other 
intelligent  voting  strategies  and  alternative  voting 
procedures, and explore constraints such as limitations 
on the number of courses that a student can take, and 
having pre-requisite courses.  
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